Who Are the Alawites?
The recent unexpected events in Syria have brought the Alawites into the international spotlight, a group previously almost unknown. Reports indicate that large numbers of Alawites from major Syrian cities are returning to their ancestral lands—mountains in Syria overlooking the Mediterranean, behind the main city of Latakia (ancient Laodicea).
But who are the Alawites?
Much like Christianity, the Islamic world is not only divided between its two main sects—Sunnis and Shiites—but also features numerous smaller religious groups, often referred to as “sects” (indicating divisions), each with unique characteristics. These include the Druze, Ismailis, Zaydis (Houthi in Yemen), Yazidis, and many others. Among these groups are the Alawites, who, for political reasons, have sometimes been classified as Shiites (though they share little in common with them) or as Sunni “good Muslims.” In reality, they form a distinct group with unique beliefs. Their relationship with other Muslims could perhaps be compared to that of Jehovah’s Witnesses to Christianity in general: while they claim to be true Christians, they reject most of the beliefs of mainstream Christianity.
Interestingly, not much is known about Alawite faith—even within the Alawite community itself—because their beliefs and practices are accessible only to a select few initiates. However, some doctrines are known to diverge significantly from mainstream Islam. These include the belief in the transmigration of souls, reincarnation, the divinity of Ali ibn Abi Talib (the fourth caliph and cousin of the Prophet Muhammad), and a holy trinity consisting of Ali, Muhammad, and one of the Prophet’s companions, Salman al-Farsi. These beliefs are far removed from Islamic orthodoxy, which is why Alawites have often faced persecution and discrimination, finding refuge in the mountains.
A recurring theme in Alawite identity is the fear of Sunni persecution, which ended only with the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Under the French Mandate that replaced Ottoman rule in 1918, Alawites—like other minorities, such as the Maronites in neighboring Lebanon—overcame traditional marginalization and began a journey toward political emancipation. This process was facilitated by their natural alignment with secularism, which coincided with their social and political advancement.
The Alawites became key supporters of the Baath Party (socialist and secular) and its pan-Arab ideology, which offered a means to transcend narrow sectarian identities. Moreover, state administration and military careers provided opportunities for social mobility and an escape from poverty. By 1955, most of the officers who brought the Baath Party to power were Alawites. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite, seized power. He surrounded himself with members of his sect, whom he trusted more, leading to an overrepresentation of Alawites in state institutions.
From 1970 onward, the Syrian regime encouraged Alawites to migrate from the mountains to the plains, granting them properties previously owned by the Sunni elite and offering them prominent positions in major Syrian cities, both in state administration and the military. However, the Alawite identity gradually shifted from a religious to a political one. The community no longer identified with their faith but rather with their support for the Assad family, while the Baath Party itself abandoned its original ideals.
Historically rejected by Islam, the Alawites had to embrace the narrative of being “good Muslims” to legitimize Assad’s leadership. Under the Assad regime, however, Alawites received no education about their own religion. Syrian textbooks do not mention the word “Alawite,” and the regime denied any public space for Alawites to practice their faith.
While the Alawites gained political and economic advantages, this came at the cost of their religious identity. They are no longer a cohesive community and lack the means to engage in dialogue with other Syrian communities, further fueling sectarian suspicion and fears.
Among Syria’s religious groups, Alawites are the most secular, with the highest number of interfaith marriages and significant integration with other sects, both personally and professionally. They view themselves as the most liberal and secular of Muslims, often highlighting their consumption of wine, free interaction between men and women, and a lifestyle closer to Western models.
Today, it is difficult to define what makes someone Alawite, apart from being born into an Alawite family. Meanwhile, the Sunni majority remembers the brutality with which the Muslim Brotherhood’s armed uprising was suppressed, resulting in around 30,000 deaths.
Alawites deny controlling the state, claiming they are underrepresented in public office and fight solely for Syria as a whole. The slogan “Assad forever” reflects their inability to separate themselves from the regime, as failing to support it is seen as a shameful betrayal.
However, the new leader of the uprising, Al-Jolani, has assured that the identity of Alawites will be respected equally to that of other ethnic and religious communities. It remains to be seen whether the new regime will succeed in building a Syria free from ethnic and religious tensions, which have reduced the country to ruins over the past 15 years.
In fact, ever since the Baath Party came to power, sectarianism has been a taboo subject; any reference to religious identities was harshly repressed. However, religious affiliation remained hidden rather than overcome. Ethno-religious identity persists in all societies and resurfaces with force in times of crisis.
This has also occurred in Europe, as seen in the former Yugoslavia, where Tito’s regime seemed to have overcome all ethnic divisions, only for them to reemerge suddenly and dramatically when the communist regime weakened and fell.