italian version

 

 

THE MASSACRE OF PETTORANO AND THE BATTLE OF MACERONE

 

 

 

 

Giovanni De Sio Cesari

www.giovannidesio.it

 

 

The Conflict

The uprisings in Isernia, the massacre of Pettorano, and the battle of Macerone are events that have been almost completely forgotten. Few people know anything about them, and even the names of these places are unknown outside their local regions. These events occurred simultaneously with the famous Battle of the Volturno between the regular army of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and Garibaldi's forces, and the meeting of Teano, which have been universally known and taught in schools for the last 150 years, starting from elementary level.

These incidents are part of the events leading to the end of the almost millennia-old Kingdom of Naples and the formation of the unified nation of Italy. But they are also the prelude to a different war that continued with ferocity for years, commonly known as the suppression of southern brigandage, part of the broader "Southern Question."

In reality, the combatants, methods, and episodes of these bloody events were quite different from Garibaldi's Expedition of the Thousand. The conflict was not just between supporters of national unity and the constitutional monarchy versus staunch defenders of the Bourbons. Essentially, it was a clash between wealthy, educated landowners on one side, and impoverished, illiterate peasants on the other, who were trapped in misery and knew only their small, rural world, completely unaware of the events beyond it. The former were called "galantuomini" (gentlemen, referring to their ceremonial clothing), while the latter were known as "cafoni," a term of uncertain origin.

These groups were also distinguished by their headgear, which was worn by both men and women at the time. A few decades later, when the "coppola" (a type of cap) became common among the poor, the conflict was referred to as a fight between "caps and hats." The landowning women wore bonnets (it was unthinkable to leave the house without one) and carried parasols, while the "cafoni" women covered their heads with shawls, or with elegant kerchiefs (known as "muccaturo"), as seen in folkloric reenactments.

There was also a significant difference in the way the two sides fought. Unlike the pitched battles of Calatafimi, the Volturno, and the siege of Gaeta, this conflict was marked by widespread, sporadic, and unpredictable violence. It resembled what we would now call guerrilla warfare, involving irregular bands that were officially deemed as suppressing brigandage. And the conduct of the fighters was markedly different. Garibaldi's men fought tenaciously but followed military and chivalrous rules, while in this conflict, there was brutal, unrestrained ferocity. Garibaldi’s forces, when taking prisoners, often let them go back to their homes or even join their ranks. In this civil conflict, there were no prisoners—enemies were killed or shot on the spot.

Interestingly, women were largely spared in this conflict. Though there are some isolated accusations, there are no confirmed reports of rape. The rage of the peasants was directed at men, but women were left untouched.

The Civil Conflict

The civil conflict erupted when King Francis II reinstated the constitution that his father, Ferdinand II, had granted in 1848. His hope was to reconcile with the liberals and eventually promote a federation of Italian states where the Kingdom of Naples would retain its own identity and monarchy. However, the move was disastrous. Liberals, naturally inclined towards Garibaldi, were appointed to key positions, which compromised any possibility of resistance. The government of Naples theoretically pledged allegiance to the king, but in reality, it sided with Garibaldi and welcomed him triumphantly when he entered Naples.

Meanwhile, the reactionaries who supported the king lost faith in the legitimist cause. However, uprisings began to break out in the countryside, sometimes spontaneously, sometimes led by nobles, sparking the civil conflict.

The Molise Uprising

The area in question is around Isernia (in Molise), which held strategic importance at the time because it was a crucial passage for the Sardinian army on its way to Naples to complete the annexation of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and sideline Garibaldi, preventing him from marching on Rome or, worse, establishing a Mazzinian-inspired republic.

The road they would travel is now known as the SS 17, but at the time, it was called the Consular Road of the Abruzzi. It crossed all of Abruzzo, reached Sulmona, and climbed the Cinque Miglia plateau, a road built during Napoleon's time (with a modern variant today). From Roccaraso, it descended toward Castel di Sangro, passed through Rionero Sannitico, and climbed the Macerone pass at 650 meters, eventually descending to Isernia.

After the reinstatement of the constitution, the National Guard was established on July 5, 1860. Theoretically, it was a military body of the Kingdom, but it was made up of local "galantuomini," all liberals, who sided with Garibaldi and the new political order. The peasants, the "cafoni," on the other hand, supported the king. They did not believe the constitution was truly the king's decision, and they understood, better than the king himself, that it was a way to give power to those opposed to him.

Thus, on July 23, 1860, the first spontaneous peasant uprisings began in Isernia, Fornelli, and other areas nearby, but were temporarily subdued by the National Guard with a few sporadic victims. Meanwhile, on September 7, Garibaldi entered Naples triumphantly, greeted by the government, theoretically still royal, and the people. It was later revealed that Liborio Romano, a liberal officially part of the royal government, had activated the Camorra to prepare the population to support Garibaldi.

The day after Garibaldi's entrance into Naples, the newly appointed mayor of Isernia, Stefano Jadopi, left for Naples to introduce himself to the new rulers. But, meanwhile, royal Bourbon forces loyal to King Francis II were preparing to resist Garibaldi, and tensions in the region were escalating, leading to the massacre of Pettorano and further conflict at Macerone.

The Molise Revolt

The area we are discussing is around Isernia (Molise), which had strategic importance at the time as it was a mandatory route for the Sardinian army to reach Naples and complete the annexation of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Additionally, it was intended to sideline Garibaldi to prevent him from being tempted to march on Rome or, even worse, establish a republic inspired by Mazzini.

The road to be traveled was what is now known as SS 17, then called the "Strada Consolare degli Abruzzi." It crossed all of Abruzzo, reached Sulmona, and from there ascended the Altopiano delle Cinque Miglia, a road built during Napoleon's era (a modern variant now exists). From Roccaraso, it descended towards Castel di Sangro, passed through Rionero Sannitico, and ascended the narrow and challenging Macerone pass at 650 meters, then descended towards Isernia. Today, this stretch is no longer used except for local traffic, as there is a fast parallel route about 20 kilometers away that reaches the Adriatic, running along the Sangro Valley.

The road passed through the center of Isernia (which now has several bypasses), and it was possible to reach the Volturno Valley via Venafro, from where one could continue to Naples, or by passing through the valley where Pettorano is located, to Benevento.

Following the Statuto, on July 5, 1860, the National Guard was established, which theoretically was an armed corps of the Kingdom but was formed and led by local landowners, all liberals. In practice, it sided with Garibaldi and the new political order that was emerging. The peasants, however, supported the king's side: they did not believe that the constitution was the king's choice and understood, more than the king himself, that it was actually a way to give space and power to those who opposed the monarchy.

In Molise, the first spontaneous peasant uprisings began on July 23, 1860, in Isernia and nearby Fornelli, and in various other places in the region. These were temporarily suppressed by the National Guard, with a few sporadic casualties. Meanwhile, on September 7, Garibaldi entered Naples triumphantly, warmly welcomed by the still royal government and the population. It would later emerge that the liberal Liborio Romano, theoretically part of the king's government, had activated the Camorra to prepare the people in favor of Garibaldi.

The next day, without delay, Isernia's newly appointed Intendant, Venditti, proclaimed the town's allegiance to the new government, sending a telegram that unreservedly praised Garibaldi's dictatorial regime. The liberals appointed landowner Stefano Jadopi as mayor, but he soon left for Naples to acquaint himself with the new rulers.

Meanwhile, the royal Sardinian army had crossed the Papal States' border, and on September 18, it defeated the Papal troops led by Lamorcière at Castelfidardo and advanced into the Abruzzi. King Francis II, on the other hand, positioned his army for a decisive battle against Garibaldi between Santa Maria (Capua Vetere) and the Maddaloni bridges, hoping to defeat the Garibaldini and return victorious to the capital.

Thus, the Isernia area became strategically crucial as it lay behind the Bourbon army and was the mandatory passage the Sardinian army had to traverse to reach Naples, as we previously noted. Garibaldi's supporters mobilized, and a small contingent of just 22 Garibaldini arrived from Naples, along with larger forces of southern volunteers: Pateras' "Cacciatori del Vesuvio," the volunteers from Matese led by Major De Blasio, and Francesco De Feo's "Legione Sannitica."

It should be noted that these troops, and others that we will mention later, were not the volunteers from all over Italy directly led by Garibaldi but were men organized by local landowners and, therefore, entered the conflict with a different spirit.

The troops, however, remain in the area for only a short time, moving on to other places in turmoil. In particular, the volunteers from Vesuvius head to Abruzzo to meet the advancing Savoy army. Thus, only the 22 Garibaldians and the local National Guard of Isernia remain.

A column of 600 men, led by a Bourbon officer, Liguoro—one of the few who had truly opposed the Garibaldians' advance in Calabria—sets out towards Molise and occupies Venafro on the road to Isernia. Immediately, a popular uprising by the peasants erupts across the region, and on September 30, the day before the Battle of the Volturno, the tragic night of Isernia occurs.

Throughout Isernia, the peasants attack the homes of the gentlemen compromised with the Garibaldians. The houses are looted and burned. All those unable to escape are mercilessly killed, and there are savage scenes of violence beyond all humanity. For example, Francesco Jadopi, the son of the mayor who had gone to Naples, has his eyes gouged out and dies from blood loss. A certain Falciari, who had urinated on a coin with the royal effigy in contempt during his adherence to the new regime, is beaten, hanged from a lamppost, and his genitals are stuffed into his mouth.

In the face of such violence, the bishop of Isernia, Saladino, is asked to intervene in the name of Christian mercy with his religious authority, but he, a fierce enemy of the liberals, flatly refuses.

Meanwhile, on October 2 and 3, the Garibaldians win the Battle of the Volturno. More precisely, the Bourbons fail in their attempt to encircle and defeat the Garibaldian forces, though the army remains intact. However, the despair is great, and they retreat towards the fortified stronghold of Capua, which is soon abandoned as they seek refuge in Gaeta, especially since the strong and well-armed Sardinian army is advancing behind them.

The Bourbons hold out in Gaeta for a long time, hoping for help from other European countries, particularly France—a help that will never come.

Meanwhile, in Isernia, the pro-Bourbon revolt has triumphed and spread throughout the region, to Carpinone, Macchiagodena, Castelpetroso, and many other places. Furious hordes of peasants hunt down the liberals, shouting "Long live Francesco and Maria!" Many landowners lose their lives as well as their property.

On October 4, however, 800 National Guards arrive from Campobasso, led by the Governor of Molise, Nicola De Luca. They assault Isernia, held by the Bourbons, and after three hours of battle at night, they enter the city.

De Luca imposes a war tax and proceeds with arrests among the rebels. Bishop Saladino, who had refused to intervene, is brutally arrested, and his secretary is killed. Executions and looting follow, though on a much smaller scale than the tragic night of September 30.

The next day, however, on October 5, more Bourbon soldiers and especially masses of armed peasants arrive. The National Guard then retreats towards Castel di Sangro to meet the Piedmontese. The few remaining in the town are massacred in the countryside, forests, and mountains, and the looting of the wealthy houses begins again.

The Battle of Macerone

The events at Pettorano made it possible to attempt a resistance against the advancing Piedmontese forces coming from Abruzzo. On September 12, the Sardinian army, strong with 50,000 well-armed and organized men, crossed the Tronto River, the border of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, without any declaration of war.

Civitella del Tronto, a formidable fortress on the border, was bypassed without difficulty and would continue to resist for over a month after the fall of Gaeta, only to be destroyed with explosives. On the other hand, the fortress of Pescara surrendered without any resistance.

The army then took the route that passed through Roccaraso and reached Castel di Sangro. From there, the road passed through a narrow gorge leading to the Macerone Pass and then to Isernia, from where one could reach Naples or, by passing through the valley where the Pettorano massacre occurred, Benevento.

The Bourbons could attempt to stop the advance at the Macerone Pass. For this attempt, regular troops were sent, joined by armed masses of peasants from Molise. The command was entrusted to a strange figure, Marshal Luigi Scotti-Douglas, who had once been a Carbonaro but had since become a staunch reactionary. He was given command of the operations.

If the Pettorano massacre was due to the errors of Colonel Nullo, the failure of the resistance at Macerone was largely due to Scotti's incompetence. In truth, the few troops and peasant bands could never stand against the strong, well-organized, and well-armed Sardinian army; they could only attempt a temporary resistance, primarily for demonstration purposes.

Scotti’s mistake was in not immediately occupying the strategic position at Macerone, the most obvious action, because he believed the Piedmontese were still far away. In fact, the bulk of the army, led by King Victor Emmanuel II, was still distant, but an advance guard of 5,000 men, led by General Cialdini, was very close. When Scotti was informed that the Piedmontese were already visible in the Vandra Valley, which lies before Macerone for those coming from Abruzzo, he believed they were not regular forces but the volunteers from Vesuvius under Pateras, who had already intervened in the events at Isernia, and he did not worry too much. However, it was actually the vanguard of Cialdini’s 5,000 soldiers.

The Piedmontese immediately rushed to occupy the strategic position, which was still, incredibly, undefended. The bersaglieri were sent ahead, leaving behind the slower, heavier troops. Only then did Scotti decide to advance to take the pass. They advanced in three columns: the first composed of regular troops on the road, while on the flanks, the peasant bands moved forward in a disorderly and spontaneous manner. The exact number of men is unknown, but it is believed there were around 3,000—certainly not enough in terms of numbers, armament, or organization, and in a disadvantageous position, to stop the 5,000-man Sardinian vanguard.

The Bourbons attacked fiercely nonetheless, and for a moment, they seemed to have the upper hand. But then the bulk of the Sardinian army arrived. The Bourbon front line was encircled and surrendered. The remaining soldiers then scattered and fled, trying to retreat to Isernia, but most were captured. The peasants, however, fled chaotically into the woods and countryside, as they had no chance to surrender because they were not considered legitimate combatants. Some of those captured were executed by firing squad. Marshal Scotti, on the other hand, surrendered, was taken to Sulmona, and sent a letter expressing regret for having served in the Bourbon army and recalling his liberal past. In the end, he would even receive a regular pension.

Meanwhile, the Piedmontese rapidly reached Isernia, which they took without resistance. Everywhere there were signs of the fierce clashes between peasants and landowners. Cialdini treated the regular soldiers according to the laws of war but ordered harsh repression against the irregular peasants, carried out through systematic mass arrests, summary executions, and the destruction of farmhouses and estates.

He published an order stating that any armed peasants found would be shot on the spot. Thus began the repression of what would later be called brigandage, which would continue to plague the South for years.

For the regular soldiers, however, Cialdini signed a convention with a municipal commission in Isernia for the care and treatment of sick and wounded soldiers of the Royal Troops.

On October 22, Victor Emmanuel II entered a desolate and destroyed Isernia, which had changed hands four times in a few days. There remains a description of an episode: a man showed the king a dagger, saying that he had wanted to pierce the heart of King Francis II with it to avenge his brother, who had been killed by the Bourbons, and entrusted the dagger to Victor Emmanuel, asking him to carry out the vengeance, as he could no longer do it himself. This reveals the desperation of the enraged masses and the vast distance from regular warfare. Certainly, Victor Emmanuel would never have killed his cousin, Francis II, but he took the dagger to calm the crowd. Others report that this episode took place in Castel di Sangro.

The next day, on October 23, the king left Isernia. Then, on October 26, the famous meeting with Garibaldi took place near Teano, in what is now Vairano Scalo, a location marked by a plaque.

On November 5, 1860, the long siege of Gaeta began, which ended on February 13, 1861. On March 17, the Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed, and on March 20, Civitella del Tronto finally surrendered and was soon after destroyed.

However, the repression of brigandage had only just begun, and it would continue with violence, reprisals, and murders for years to come.

Conclusion

At the time, these events were referred to as the repression of brigandage—a harsh but necessary and commendable task that naturally fell to the army of the newly formed Kingdom of Italy. Later, starting with Gramsci, it was interpreted as a popular uprising (of the proletariat, so to speak, before the term even existed), and more recently, pro-Bourbon movements have described it as a struggle against an invader. We can say it was all three: certainly, the insurgents were primarily brigands, not guerrilla fighters, but there was also a revolt by the poorest people, and indeed, that army (the Piedmontese) appeared foreign to them.

However, we might more accurately describe it as what the French call a jacquerie—a peasant revolt born from desperation due to worsening conditions of their already miserable lives. Such revolts have occurred repeatedly, not only in France but across the world: the Comuneros in Castile in the 1400s (as depicted in Lope de Vega’s Fuente Ovejuna), the peasant uprisings during Luther's time in the 1500s, Pugachev's revolt in Russia in the 1700s (described by Pushkin), and the many periodic uprisings in China and India. These are revolts of desperation, marked by violence and massacres but without a plan or program, and thus doomed to fail, even if sometimes they achieved short-term success.

In reality, there had been a notable peasant uprising in Bronte, Sicily, famously depicted in a novella by Verga. The peasants rose up and massacred landowners, believing that the freedom Garibaldi promised meant liberation from the landowners. In that case, Garibaldi sent Bixio to restore order, as a peasant revolt was the last thing he had in mind. Bixio repressed it violently with summary executions, followed by lengthy trials. However, while Sicilian peasants, traditionally hostile to the Bourbons, had risen in Garibaldi’s name, in the rest of the Kingdom of Naples, the revolts were the opposite—against Garibaldi and in favor of King Francis II.

We might be puzzled by this choice, which seems illogical to us: why support the old order that led to poverty and not the modern one, which at least promised, even if only in words, the redemption of oppressed peoples? The key factor was that most of the landowners sided with Garibaldi, so naturally, the peasants took the opposite side.

Another aspect, which might be hard for modern minds to grasp, is that in traditional monarchies where kings ruled by divine grace, the king was not seen as responsible for the evils and injustices that occurred. Instead, blame was placed on his collaborators and, by extension, those who held administrative and leadership roles. Thus, the nobles or simply the landowners were considered entirely at fault for abusing the king’s trust, with the hope always that the king himself could be appealed to for justice. In our case, these galantuomini (gentlemen) were also viewed as traitors to the king and the religion, to which everyone remained deeply devout—the atheism that would later take hold was still far off.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Battle of the Volturno

 
 

Giovanni De Sio Cesari

www.giovannidesio.it


The Battle of the Volturno was fought on October 1st and continued partially until October 2nd, 1860. It was one of the most important military engagements of the Italian Risorgimento and the only time the Bourbon army engaged the Garibaldians in a large-scale field battle. Previously, there had only been small-scale skirmishes; in general, the Garibaldians had conquered almost the entire Kingdom up to Naples without facing a full-scale field battle.
The Volturno River played no role in the battle, despite giving its name to the event, as the fighting took place near the Volturno, not on it.
The King of Naples, Francis II (popularly known as "Francischiello"), had left Naples with the intent to gather all troops still loyal to him, engage the Garibaldians in a field battle, and then reconquer Naples and the entire Kingdom.

THE BOURBON ARMY
Commonly referred to as the "Bourbon" army in Risorgimento historiography to emphasize its support for the Bourbon king, it was in fact the regular army of the Kingdom. Except for the "foreign corps," the soldiers were conscripts, all subjects of the Kingdom from the continental part, as Sicily had been excluded for being considered unreliable. Therefore, it was essentially a Neapolitan army.
The career officers were also from the Kingdom, although they often bore foreign noble names due to the international nature of the nobility at the time. Most had been trained at the prestigious Nunziatella Military Academy in Naples, which still operates today.
However, despite being a professional army, it had no experience in regular warfare or military campaigns. Since 1815, the time of Murat, the Neapolitan army had not fought in any regular wars, instead being involved in repressing uprisings in Naples and the Sicilian secession in 1848. It was often deployed against brigands, who would flee and hide at its approach.
The army had over 41,000 men stationed between Capua, the Volturno, and Gaeta. However, only 25,000 men and 42 cannons participated in the battle. The army included 8,000 men from foreign corps, Swiss and Bavarian soldiers under the command of Von Mechel. A few years earlier, following a mutiny, the foreign corps, traditionally composed of Swiss soldiers, had been disbanded. However, some Swiss remained, and others had been replaced by Bavarians.
The general command was entrusted to Marshal Giosue Ritucci, a highly cautious and hesitant man with little prestige. The officers were in constant conflict with each other and, overall, did not rise to the challenges of their roles. However, the soldiers were eager to fight, determined to reclaim their pride after allowing the "Garibaldesi" to conquer the Kingdom with such ease. They had little trust in their officers, suspecting them of betraying the king, especially after many had defected to the enemy, while others showed such incompetence that it led to suspicions of treason and corruption.
Thus, the Neapolitan army was driven by fighting spirit but lacked trustworthy leadership, a critical disadvantage in battle.

THE GARIBALDIAN ARMY
Known as "Garibaldesi" by the Neapolitans, they officially formed the "Southern Army." It is often thought they were enthusiastic but inexperienced youths. In reality, many were men who had already fought in the Second War of Independence, some even in the First, and in the defense of the Roman Republic in 1848. Many were part of the regular Piedmontese army and had taken leave to join the Garibaldians with the tacit approval of the Piedmontese government.
Above all, their commander was Garibaldi, a living legend with unquestioned prestige and great authority, as well as vast military experience gained in the South American wars.
In total, there were 24,000 men with 24 artillery pieces, all enthusiastic and confident that Garibaldi would lead them to victory.
There were also foreign volunteers, all eager to fight for freedom. The foreign contingents included 440 from the Hungarian Legion, 105 English riflemen, 456 from the English Legion, 260 from the French Legion, and additionally, some Bersaglieri and 20 artillerymen from the regular Piedmontese army, who had landed in Naples from Piedmontese ships. Of the thousand who had landed at Marsala, only about half remained.

THE BATTLE PLAN
King Francis II had asked the French General Le Moricière to lead the army, but at that time, he was commanding the troops of the Papal States. Thus, Ritucci was appointed, but he hesitated to engage in a field battle. The king then requested a battle plan from Le Moricière, who drew one up by simply looking at a map of the area.
The plan was then presented to Ritucci, who criticized it but accepted it out of obedience to the king and possibly to avoid responsibility in case of failure.
The rather complex plan called for four main assault columns. The first column, on the right flank, was to attack the Garibaldians near the village of Santa Maria (now Santa Maria Capua Vetere, which stands on the site of ancient Capua). A second column was to attack the center near the village of Sant'Angelo (now Sant'Angelo in Formis) at the foot of Mount Tifata. A third column was to flank the Tifatini Mountains (which extend between the two villages and Maddaloni). This column, in turn, would split into two: one was to attack the Garibaldians at the Ponti della Valle pass on the far left, while the other would cross the hills around Caserta Vecchia to join the first.
Thus, they would outflank any Garibaldian forces still resisting at Santa Maria and Sant'Angelo and open the road to Naples to reconquer the capital. The plan was brilliant, but as Ritucci had noted, the two extreme wings would be about 60 kilometers apart, with little possibility of communication and mutual support. Moreover, there was no reserve force to deploy where needed. As a result, the four assaults risked becoming isolated from each other, which is what eventually happened.

Garibaldi's defense plan, on the other hand, called for better coordination among nearby units, and a large reserve was established near Caserta under General Türr, ready to intervene wherever necessary. We will follow the events of the four fronts separately.

THE FRONT AT PONTI DELLA VALLE
A column of 8,000 men circumvented the Tifatini mountains by passing through Limatola, where it split into two groups: one under the command of Ruiz de Balestreros, and the other led by Von Mechel. The latter, a Swiss commander of foreign troops, led a column of 3,000 men, all professional foreign soldiers (Swiss and Bavarians). Skirting the hills, they marched through the Isclero valley, encountering a small group of Garibaldians entrenched near the village of Dugenta. However, this consisted of only a few dozen men who quickly retreated. The column then headed to the Ponti della Valle, a narrow pass between two hills crossed by the Carolino Aqueduct, an imposing structure 529 meters long and up to 55.8 meters high, modeled after Roman aqueducts with three tiers of arches (the so-called "bridges"). The aqueduct supplies water to the waterfall in the park of Caserta. Here, the Garibaldians led by Nino Bixio awaited them, determined to defend the bridges. The Bourbon attack was fierce, and hand-to-hand combat ensued. An assault led by Von Mechel’s son forced the Garibaldians to retreat, and for a moment, the position seemed to be in Bourbon hands. Von Mechel's son died in the assault. His father embraced his dying son but professionally continued the battle. Meanwhile, the Garibaldian reserves from Caserta, descending from one of the hills of the pass, Monte San Michele, arrived. The Bourbons grew increasingly exhausted, while the Garibaldians received fresh reinforcements. In the end, Von Mechel had to abandon the attempt to break through the Garibaldian lines and was forced to retreat towards Dugenta. The reserve organized by Garibaldi proved crucial, while the Bourbons' inability to receive reinforcements was fatal.

THE FRONT AT CASERTA VECCHIA
Von Mechel could have been aided by the column advancing through the hills, which was nearby, but this did not happen as we will now explain. From Limatola, as mentioned, a column of 5,000 men—all local troops—under the command of Ruiz de Balestreros, who was also Neapolitan despite his Spanish-sounding name, had broken off. This column advanced extremely slowly, unaware of the events unfolding nearby at Ponti della Valle with Von Mechel's column. At one point, they clashed with 300 Garibaldians entrenched in a high position near the castle of Morrone (now known as Castelmorrone). Balestreros could have bypassed the Garibaldian position, but instead chose to launch a frontal attack. The 300 Garibaldians, led by the heroic Pilade Bronzetti, a veteran of the First and Second Wars of Independence and the Roman Republic, were in an excellent position and resisted the overwhelming enemy forces for many hours until they were finally driven from the hill. At Castelmorrone, 30 Garibaldians were killed, including Pilade Bronzetti, who died almost by accident: he presented a white flag of surrender, but due to a misunderstanding, it was not immediately recognized, and he was shot while still holding his sword.
In the town of Castelmorrone, a plaque commemorates the event, comparing the 300 Garibaldians to the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae. While fighting raged at Morrone, 2,000 Neapolitan soldiers advanced and eventually reached their destination of Caserta Vecchia. However, upon learning of Von Mechel's retreat, Balestreros promptly ordered the withdrawal of the advanced forces that had reached Caserta Vecchia. The soldiers, however, refused to obey, believing it to be yet another betrayal by their officers, and insisted on advancing further. Commander Nicoletti felt compelled to follow them. Balestreros, on the other hand, considered them mutineers and left them to their fate. Some of his officers even openly shouted against him, deeming it disgraceful to abandon the advanced troops. The soldiers even threatened to shoot him. Eventually, they retreated, but Balestreros was never given another command in the campaign. The advanced group at Caserta Vecchia was left isolated. The following day, October 2, they were surrounded by Garibaldians and forced to surrender. The operation also involved bersaglieri, who had disembarked from Piedmontese ships in the port of Naples.
These troops were the first and only large group of prisoners taken by the Garibaldians, who had previously allowed captured Bourbon soldiers to return home. This large group, however, was handed over to the regular Piedmontese army and endured significant hardships.
The defense of the castle of Morrone, or if you prefer, Balestreros' stubborn and pointless persistence, prevented this column from attacking the Garibaldians at Ponti della Valle, thus reversing the outcome of the battle.

THE FRONT AT S. ANGELO
At dawn on October 1, the Neapolitan army emerged from the morning mist and vigorously attacked the Garibaldians entrenched at S. Angelo. Initially, they managed to push the Garibaldians back, but the Garibaldians, having received reinforcements, counterattacked and repelled the Bourbons. The Bourbons attacked again, advancing while the Garibaldians retreated towards the summit of Monte Tifata, 600 meters high, overlooking the battlefield. The Neapolitans pressed the attack for a long time, advancing along the mountain's flanks. However, near the end of the day, Ritucci deemed it futile to continue and ordered a retreat. The attack had been repelled. Piedmontese artillerymen, who had disembarked in Naples, also took part in the clash, skillfully using new rifled cannons, which played a crucial role in determining the battle's outcome.

THE FRONT AT S. MARIA
Here too, repeated attacks occurred throughout the day, but in the end, the Bourbons were repelled by the Garibaldians. Two shameful episodes occurred in the Neapolitan army. At one point, faced with fierce Garibaldian resistance, the Royal Guard Grenadiers, an elite unit that paraded elegantly in Naples in front of the king, were called in. However, when faced with real combat, they were seized with fear and fled in disgrace without putting up much of a fight. A similar incident occurred with a cavalry squadron: faced with Garibaldian fire, they fled in disarray all the way to Capua. The unit was led by Filippo Pisacane, brother of the hero of the Sapri expedition, who remained loyal to the king but failed to display the same courage as his brother. At the end of the day, the Garibaldian resistance on this front was not overcome, and the Neapolitans retreated.

BATTLE OUTCOME
Both sides suffered similar losses. The Garibaldians had 300 dead, 1,300 wounded, and 300 prisoners, mostly from Castelmorrone. The Bourbons suffered 308 dead, 771 wounded, and 2,177 prisoners (mostly from Caserta Vecchia). The Neapolitan army was repelled, though it was not a definitive defeat. The forces on both sides remained the same as before the battle, meaning that, theoretically, the attack could have been repeated, especially if the fresh forces scattered between Capua and Gaeta, which had not participated in the operations, had been engaged. The Garibaldians, meanwhile, were also not in a position to launch an attack.
However, the fact that the Bourbons had been repelled weighed heavily on morale. Above all, the excessive caution of the commander and officers prevented a bold move that could have truly changed the situation. Meanwhile, the Piedmontese troops that had defeated the papal forces under Lamoricière at Castelfidardo on September 18 crossed the Tronto River and invaded the Kingdom of Naples. They advanced rapidly through Abruzzo despite some resistance from regular troops and irregular bands. On October 26, King Victor Emmanuel met Garibaldi near Teano, and the Piedmontese army took over from the Garibaldian forces (Garibaldi retired to Caprera), continuing the war against the Bourbons on its own.
King Francis II preferred to retreat to Gaeta for a prolonged resistance, hoping for foreign aid that never came, rendering the bloody defense futile. The failure at the Volturno effectively marked the end of the Kingdom of Naples after nearly 800 years of existence.

 

 

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