italian version

 

Battle of the Volturno

 
 

Giovanni De Sio Cesari

www.giovannidesio.it


The Battle of the Volturno was fought on October 1st and continued partially until October 2nd, 1860. It was one of the most important military engagements of the Italian Risorgimento and the only time the Bourbon army engaged the Garibaldians in a large-scale field battle. Previously, there had only been small-scale skirmishes; in general, the Garibaldians had conquered almost the entire Kingdom up to Naples without facing a full-scale field battle.
The Volturno River played no role in the battle, despite giving its name to the event, as the fighting took place near the Volturno, not on it.
The King of Naples, Francis II (popularly known as "Francischiello"), had left Naples with the intent to gather all troops still loyal to him, engage the Garibaldians in a field battle, and then reconquer Naples and the entire Kingdom.

THE BOURBON ARMY
Commonly referred to as the "Bourbon" army in Risorgimento historiography to emphasize its support for the Bourbon king, it was in fact the regular army of the Kingdom. Except for the "foreign corps," the soldiers were conscripts, all subjects of the Kingdom from the continental part, as Sicily had been excluded for being considered unreliable. Therefore, it was essentially a Neapolitan army.
The career officers were also from the Kingdom, although they often bore foreign noble names due to the international nature of the nobility at the time. Most had been trained at the prestigious Nunziatella Military Academy in Naples, which still operates today.
However, despite being a professional army, it had no experience in regular warfare or military campaigns. Since 1815, the time of Murat, the Neapolitan army had not fought in any regular wars, instead being involved in repressing uprisings in Naples and the Sicilian secession in 1848. It was often deployed against brigands, who would flee and hide at its approach.
The army had over 41,000 men stationed between Capua, the Volturno, and Gaeta. However, only 25,000 men and 42 cannons participated in the battle. The army included 8,000 men from foreign corps, Swiss and Bavarian soldiers under the command of Von Mechel. A few years earlier, following a mutiny, the foreign corps, traditionally composed of Swiss soldiers, had been disbanded. However, some Swiss remained, and others had been replaced by Bavarians.
The general command was entrusted to Marshal Giosue Ritucci, a highly cautious and hesitant man with little prestige. The officers were in constant conflict with each other and, overall, did not rise to the challenges of their roles. However, the soldiers were eager to fight, determined to reclaim their pride after allowing the "Garibaldesi" to conquer the Kingdom with such ease. They had little trust in their officers, suspecting them of betraying the king, especially after many had defected to the enemy, while others showed such incompetence that it led to suspicions of treason and corruption.
Thus, the Neapolitan army was driven by fighting spirit but lacked trustworthy leadership, a critical disadvantage in battle.

THE GARIBALDIAN ARMY
Known as "Garibaldesi" by the Neapolitans, they officially formed the "Southern Army." It is often thought they were enthusiastic but inexperienced youths. In reality, many were men who had already fought in the Second War of Independence, some even in the First, and in the defense of the Roman Republic in 1848. Many were part of the regular Piedmontese army and had taken leave to join the Garibaldians with the tacit approval of the Piedmontese government.
Above all, their commander was Garibaldi, a living legend with unquestioned prestige and great authority, as well as vast military experience gained in the South American wars.
In total, there were 24,000 men with 24 artillery pieces, all enthusiastic and confident that Garibaldi would lead them to victory.
There were also foreign volunteers, all eager to fight for freedom. The foreign contingents included 440 from the Hungarian Legion, 105 English riflemen, 456 from the English Legion, 260 from the French Legion, and additionally, some Bersaglieri and 20 artillerymen from the regular Piedmontese army, who had landed in Naples from Piedmontese ships. Of the thousand who had landed at Marsala, only about half remained.

THE BATTLE PLAN
King Francis II had asked the French General Le Moricière to lead the army, but at that time, he was commanding the troops of the Papal States. Thus, Ritucci was appointed, but he hesitated to engage in a field battle. The king then requested a battle plan from Le Moricière, who drew one up by simply looking at a map of the area.
The plan was then presented to Ritucci, who criticized it but accepted it out of obedience to the king and possibly to avoid responsibility in case of failure.
The rather complex plan called for four main assault columns. The first column, on the right flank, was to attack the Garibaldians near the village of Santa Maria (now Santa Maria Capua Vetere, which stands on the site of ancient Capua). A second column was to attack the center near the village of Sant'Angelo (now Sant'Angelo in Formis) at the foot of Mount Tifata. A third column was to flank the Tifatini Mountains (which extend between the two villages and Maddaloni). This column, in turn, would split into two: one was to attack the Garibaldians at the Ponti della Valle pass on the far left, while the other would cross the hills around Caserta Vecchia to join the first.
Thus, they would outflank any Garibaldian forces still resisting at Santa Maria and Sant'Angelo and open the road to Naples to reconquer the capital. The plan was brilliant, but as Ritucci had noted, the two extreme wings would be about 60 kilometers apart, with little possibility of communication and mutual support. Moreover, there was no reserve force to deploy where needed. As a result, the four assaults risked becoming isolated from each other, which is what eventually happened.

Garibaldi's defense plan, on the other hand, called for better coordination among nearby units, and a large reserve was established near Caserta under General Türr, ready to intervene wherever necessary. We will follow the events of the four fronts separately.

THE FRONT AT PONTI DELLA VALLE
A column of 8,000 men circumvented the Tifatini mountains by passing through Limatola, where it split into two groups: one under the command of Ruiz de Balestreros, and the other led by Von Mechel. The latter, a Swiss commander of foreign troops, led a column of 3,000 men, all professional foreign soldiers (Swiss and Bavarians). Skirting the hills, they marched through the Isclero valley, encountering a small group of Garibaldians entrenched near the village of Dugenta. However, this consisted of only a few dozen men who quickly retreated. The column then headed to the Ponti della Valle, a narrow pass between two hills crossed by the Carolino Aqueduct, an imposing structure 529 meters long and up to 55.8 meters high, modeled after Roman aqueducts with three tiers of arches (the so-called "bridges"). The aqueduct supplies water to the waterfall in the park of Caserta. Here, the Garibaldians led by Nino Bixio awaited them, determined to defend the bridges. The Bourbon attack was fierce, and hand-to-hand combat ensued. An assault led by Von Mechel’s son forced the Garibaldians to retreat, and for a moment, the position seemed to be in Bourbon hands. Von Mechel's son died in the assault. His father embraced his dying son but professionally continued the battle. Meanwhile, the Garibaldian reserves from Caserta, descending from one of the hills of the pass, Monte San Michele, arrived. The Bourbons grew increasingly exhausted, while the Garibaldians received fresh reinforcements. In the end, Von Mechel had to abandon the attempt to break through the Garibaldian lines and was forced to retreat towards Dugenta. The reserve organized by Garibaldi proved crucial, while the Bourbons' inability to receive reinforcements was fatal.

THE FRONT AT CASERTA VECCHIA
Von Mechel could have been aided by the column advancing through the hills, which was nearby, but this did not happen as we will now explain. From Limatola, as mentioned, a column of 5,000 men—all local troops—under the command of Ruiz de Balestreros, who was also Neapolitan despite his Spanish-sounding name, had broken off. This column advanced extremely slowly, unaware of the events unfolding nearby at Ponti della Valle with Von Mechel's column. At one point, they clashed with 300 Garibaldians entrenched in a high position near the castle of Morrone (now known as Castelmorrone). Balestreros could have bypassed the Garibaldian position, but instead chose to launch a frontal attack. The 300 Garibaldians, led by the heroic Pilade Bronzetti, a veteran of the First and Second Wars of Independence and the Roman Republic, were in an excellent position and resisted the overwhelming enemy forces for many hours until they were finally driven from the hill. At Castelmorrone, 30 Garibaldians were killed, including Pilade Bronzetti, who died almost by accident: he presented a white flag of surrender, but due to a misunderstanding, it was not immediately recognized, and he was shot while still holding his sword.
In the town of Castelmorrone, a plaque commemorates the event, comparing the 300 Garibaldians to the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae. While fighting raged at Morrone, 2,000 Neapolitan soldiers advanced and eventually reached their destination of Caserta Vecchia. However, upon learning of Von Mechel's retreat, Balestreros promptly ordered the withdrawal of the advanced forces that had reached Caserta Vecchia. The soldiers, however, refused to obey, believing it to be yet another betrayal by their officers, and insisted on advancing further. Commander Nicoletti felt compelled to follow them. Balestreros, on the other hand, considered them mutineers and left them to their fate. Some of his officers even openly shouted against him, deeming it disgraceful to abandon the advanced troops. The soldiers even threatened to shoot him. Eventually, they retreated, but Balestreros was never given another command in the campaign. The advanced group at Caserta Vecchia was left isolated. The following day, October 2, they were surrounded by Garibaldians and forced to surrender. The operation also involved bersaglieri, who had disembarked from Piedmontese ships in the port of Naples.
These troops were the first and only large group of prisoners taken by the Garibaldians, who had previously allowed captured Bourbon soldiers to return home. This large group, however, was handed over to the regular Piedmontese army and endured significant hardships.
The defense of the castle of Morrone, or if you prefer, Balestreros' stubborn and pointless persistence, prevented this column from attacking the Garibaldians at Ponti della Valle, thus reversing the outcome of the battle.

THE FRONT AT S. ANGELO
At dawn on October 1, the Neapolitan army emerged from the morning mist and vigorously attacked the Garibaldians entrenched at S. Angelo. Initially, they managed to push the Garibaldians back, but the Garibaldians, having received reinforcements, counterattacked and repelled the Bourbons. The Bourbons attacked again, advancing while the Garibaldians retreated towards the summit of Monte Tifata, 600 meters high, overlooking the battlefield. The Neapolitans pressed the attack for a long time, advancing along the mountain's flanks. However, near the end of the day, Ritucci deemed it futile to continue and ordered a retreat. The attack had been repelled. Piedmontese artillerymen, who had disembarked in Naples, also took part in the clash, skillfully using new rifled cannons, which played a crucial role in determining the battle's outcome.

THE FRONT AT S. MARIA
Here too, repeated attacks occurred throughout the day, but in the end, the Bourbons were repelled by the Garibaldians. Two shameful episodes occurred in the Neapolitan army. At one point, faced with fierce Garibaldian resistance, the Royal Guard Grenadiers, an elite unit that paraded elegantly in Naples in front of the king, were called in. However, when faced with real combat, they were seized with fear and fled in disgrace without putting up much of a fight. A similar incident occurred with a cavalry squadron: faced with Garibaldian fire, they fled in disarray all the way to Capua. The unit was led by Filippo Pisacane, brother of the hero of the Sapri expedition, who remained loyal to the king but failed to display the same courage as his brother. At the end of the day, the Garibaldian resistance on this front was not overcome, and the Neapolitans retreated.

BATTLE OUTCOME
Both sides suffered similar losses. The Garibaldians had 300 dead, 1,300 wounded, and 300 prisoners, mostly from Castelmorrone. The Bourbons suffered 308 dead, 771 wounded, and 2,177 prisoners (mostly from Caserta Vecchia). The Neapolitan army was repelled, though it was not a definitive defeat. The forces on both sides remained the same as before the battle, meaning that, theoretically, the attack could have been repeated, especially if the fresh forces scattered between Capua and Gaeta, which had not participated in the operations, had been engaged. The Garibaldians, meanwhile, were also not in a position to launch an attack.
However, the fact that the Bourbons had been repelled weighed heavily on morale. Above all, the excessive caution of the commander and officers prevented a bold move that could have truly changed the situation. Meanwhile, the Piedmontese troops that had defeated the papal forces under Lamoricière at Castelfidardo on September 18 crossed the Tronto River and invaded the Kingdom of Naples. They advanced rapidly through Abruzzo despite some resistance from regular troops and irregular bands. On October 26, King Victor Emmanuel met Garibaldi near Teano, and the Piedmontese army took over from the Garibaldian forces (Garibaldi retired to Caprera), continuing the war against the Bourbons on its own.
King Francis II preferred to retreat to Gaeta for a prolonged resistance, hoping for foreign aid that never came, rendering the bloody defense futile. The failure at the Volturno effectively marked the end of the Kingdom of Naples after nearly 800 years of existence.

 

 

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