The events in Gaza have garnered significant attention from the mass media and global public opinion, particularly due to the interventions of two distinct bodies: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICJ is a UN body and thus applies to all UN member states, which is nearly the entire world. It rules on the actions of states, but unlike any other court, it lacks real means to enforce its verdicts. Consequently, its judgments hold only moral value: they are accepted and praised by those who agree with them and harshly criticized by those who do not.

In this specific case, it should be clarified that the ICJ did not order Israel to stop its operations in Gaza on the grounds that it constituted genocide but rather to refrain from actions that could lead to genocide, which is quite different. However, it has been generally perceived as a condemnation of Israel's actions, though it would only be so if it resulted in genocide. Moreover, no coercive measures are provided, and each state, whether friend or foe, will continue to act as if the injunction had not been issued.

The ICC, on the other hand, judges individuals, not states. It is a more recent body, still connected to the UN, but recognized only by some states and not by the most important ones, including Russia, China, India, the USA, and in this case, Israel. However, unlike the ICJ, its judgments can have real consequences if a member state actually enforces its decisions by arresting the accused. In our case, the Prosecutor (equivalent to our PM) has requested the indictment of Hamas leaders and Netanyahu, placing them on the same level. It should be noted that there is no arrest warrant but only a request that will need to be reviewed by the Court and potentially accepted. The same Court has issued an arrest warrant for Putin, who could thus be arrested in a country adhering to the ICC.

Leaving aside the impartiality of such bodies, composed of individuals chosen based on geographical and/or ideological criteria, it can be noted that the Prosecutor of the ICC is of British nationality but of Pakistani origin, belonging to an Islamic group. The courts, of course, operate on legal grounds and diligently and carefully seek evidence of the contested facts. In reality, it seems that these details are of little interest to understanding the facts. Here and there, some facts may have been exaggerated or downplayed, perhaps invented or entirely hidden, but essentially the facts are quite clear, both those of October 7 and those following the Israeli invasion of Gaza.

Therefore, our problem is to try to understand not the details of individual events but the very basis of the discourse: do the conventions of war and humanitarian law in general have consistency, and above all, is it really possible for them to be respected? Experience in the last century shows us that all belligerents have more or less violated these norms almost without exception: we must then ask ourselves if it is only a matter of bad intentions, malevolence, or inescapable war needs.

The starting point of any examination is the fact that wars are not beautiful sports competitions in which you win only by following the rules; otherwise, you are disqualified, expelled, losers. Instead, wars are won by those who use the necessary means to win them, whatever they may be. It is true, however, that in the last century, indeed, I would say always in history, attempts have been made to find rules that somehow limit the damage, and particularly from the last century, efforts have been made to ensure that civilians are not too involved.

However, these conventions refer to wars fought in open fields between armies and were respected in the "regular" Arab-Israeli wars of '56, '67, and '73. But such norms have never been respected in so-called asymmetric wars in which a regular army fights against armed groups that cannot face it in open fields. It is not a matter of will but of military necessity: in this case, Hamas cannot respect them because it cannot fight in open fields, and Israel, for the same reason, in reverse, just as it has always happened in countless other cases.

It should also be noted that, in fact, the laws of war only apply reciprocally: you do not kill my civilians, and I do not kill yours. They were indeed observed in the past in wars between Europeans who accepted those rules but not in colonial wars where the other side did not accept them. Hamas, on October 7, did not respect even a minimum of humanity, let alone civilians: why should Israel respect them now?

Some then observe that Hamas is a group of terrorists while Israel is a state, even a democratic one. This is also the reason why the ICJ does not indict Hamas, which is not a state, while the ICC indicts both Hamas and Israeli leaders because they are individuals. However, the argument holds little weight. Firstly, the reduction of Hamas to terrorists, to mere criminals, is not accepted by all those who support them and generally by all those who for "Palestine Free" mean the destruction of the state of Israel with inevitable second Shoah.

But the Hamas militants cannot in any way be considered common criminals hiding among the people. They are from the people of Gaza, which they have administered for 15 years unchallenged: it is true that there is no democracy, but there is no democracy in any Arab country. Moreover, there is an immense Middle Eastern world that supports them and celebrates them as heroes, even Erdogan. They are supported by Hezbollah, Syrians, Houthis, Iranians, and even those who oppose them (Emirates) do not dare to stand against them. It would be like saying the Allies should have sought out the Nazis house by house and not leveled Germany. There is a war in Gaza, not a search for fugitives. A similar issue was raised for many acts of terrorism, starting with those of September 11, but political movements cannot be confused with common delinquency like that of the mafia.

It is also said that the Israelis give a disproportionate response to the events of October 7: 32,000 Palestinian victims compared to 1,400 Israelis, let's say almost 30 to 1. But then the Israelis, in response to October 7, should have randomly taken 1200 Palestinians, murdered them, beheaded the children, horribly raped the women before killing them, taken hundreds of hostages? That would have been absurd. The Israeli action is not intended to be revenge but a means of deterrence to prevent it from happening again: to show that the attempt to destroy Israel brings only disasters to those who attempt it.

It is not that Israelis kill all the Palestinians they meet, in this way they could kill everyone in Gaza: then it would be genocide. The problem is that if Hamas hides among the crowds, in hospitals, in schools, then the Israeli soldiers should simply let themselves be hit because they could not strike the militants without hitting civilians, women, and children among whom they hide: in short, they should only withdraw, something certainly absurd and never seen in any asymmetric war.

It is also true that in reality, the Israelis also strike beyond the strict military necessities, but this has happened in all wars, even in the so-called traditional ones. For example, the Allies dropped incendiary bombs on Dresden, razed most of Germany, and against Japan, they even used the atomic bomb with the undeclared but evident aim of breaking the spirit of resistance of those nations. The war ended when Japan and Germany surrendered: if Hamas announced its withdrawal from Gaza (not even surrendering), the war would be over; for a long truce that would revive Gaza, it would be enough to return the hostages: the responsibility is not all of the Israelis. All this does not mean approving Israel's action, but the real and well-founded criticisms seem to me to be others.

Netanyahu's declared goal would be to destroy Hamas: but is this possible? Even if, as announced, but truly unlikely, Hamas has lost most of its militants and accumulated war material, it has not been defeated: Hamas is not a group of fanatics, of criminal terrorists, but an idea widespread throughout the Middle East, according to which the war on Israel is only the beginning of the metaphysical war between believers and unbelievers, between good and evil, which will end when Allah decides to give the inevitable victory to the believers. Palestine will be completely free (destruction of Israel) from the Jordan to the sea and Islam will return to the golden age of the first caliphs. However, in the Palestinian and Arab world in general, there is also a part, for now a minority, that rejects this metaphysical clash and realizes that for the rebirth of the Arab world, it is necessary to be inspired by Western models, as has happened in the Far East, and not by the mythical times of the first caliphs.

Therefore, an alternative to Hamas must be offered to the Arabs of Gaza, which can only be a Palestinian state. But nothing is moving in this direction, the Arabs see no alternative, and the conflict will continue into the next generations. In reality, Netanyahu does not have a real action plan capable of ending the eternal conflict: this is the real fault of Israel.